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Most economists intuitively consider purchasing power parity (PPP) to be
true. Nevertheless, quite surprisingly, the empirical literature is not very
supportive for PPP. In this paper, however, we nd evidence in favor of
PPP using a new test. The test is embedded in a Markov regime-switching
model for the exchange rate, because earlier papers have shown that this
model describes the data better than the popular random walk. We allow
for PPP by making the regime-switching probabilities depend on the PPP
deviation. Our second result is that PPP disequilibria have become shorter-
lived for some exchange rates, which may be due to an increase in the trade
openness of the countries involved.
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1 Introduction
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is one of the oldest and most important theories in
international economics. It is commonly used as a long-run concept in relative terms,
stating that in the long-run the exchange rate is proportional to the ratio of the two
countries price levels, that is, the PPP exchange rate. Long-run relative PPP is also
the version of PPP we analyze in this paper. Most economists intuitively consider this
hypothesis to be true. Moreover, time plots of exchange rates PPP rates support it.
For instance, gures 1A, 2A and 3A plot the U.S. dollar price of one German mark,
Japanese yen and U.K. pound, respectively, and the corresponding PPP rates from
April 1974 to July 1997; the gures suggest a long-run comovement of exchange rates
and PPP rates.1
Quite surprisingly, however, the existing empirical literature is not very supportive
for PPP. The main contribution of this paper is that we nd evidence in favor of PPP
in all three of the worlds most important exchange rates, that is, the U.S. dollar vis-
à-vis the German mark, Japanese yen and U.K. pound. This result is not only of
theoretical importance. It also has policy implications, because the long-term behavior
of exchange rates relative to prices a¤ects many economic decisions. For instance,
banks need to assess the real future value of their long-term loans denominated in
foreign currency. Moreover, international rms who have to decide upon foreign direct
investments require reliable forecasts of the real value of the long-lasting income stream
generated by the investment projects.
The reason behind the remarkable di¤erence between our evidence in favor of PPP
and the inconclusive results in the existing literature is that we use a new test. It is
embedded in a model that explicitly allows for long swings in exchange rates, such as
the appreciation swing of the dollar in the rst half of the eighties and the subsequent
depreciation swing. A long swings model seems more appropriate than the popular
random walk, because it provides a better specication of the exchange rate generating
process, as earlier studies have shown (see Engel and Hamilton (1990), Engel (1994) and
Klaassen (1999), among others). Given the long swings model, we can test for PPP by
examining whether a swing is likely to end when the PPP disequilibrium becomes large
and whether the next swing governs the exchange rate back to its PPP equilibrium.
More formally, we test the null of no PPP in a Markov regime-switching model in which
the regime-switching probabilities depend on the PPP deviation.
Given the evidence in favor of PPP, we can go one level deeper into the concept of
1Details on the construction of the PPP rates will be given in subsection 3.1.
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PPP. The argument behind PPP is that goods arbitrage equalizes prices in the same
currency across countries. Because it is commonly believed that goods markets have
become more integrated, making arbitrage easier, it is interesting to examine whether
PPP disequilibria have become shorter-lived, which is the second and nal purpose of
the paper. We conclude that they have for the German mark and the U.K. pound, but
not for the Japanese yen. This may indeed be explained by changes in trade openness,
as we nd that both European economies have become much more open, while Japan
is still relatively closed.
In the literature so far, many authors have examined PPP (see Froot and Rogo¤
(1996) for a detailed overview). They usually concentrate on the real exchange rate
and employ unit-root tests to examine the null that it follows a random walk against
the alternative of stationarity, that is, PPP. Early studies, such as Meese and Rogo¤
(1988) and Mark (1990), use post-Bretton-Woods time series data and nd no evidence
of PPP. This may, of course, be due to the absence of PPP. However, it may also be
caused by a lack of power of the tests. As Frankel (1986, 1990) shows, a potential
reason for this is that the post-Bretton-Woods period may be too short to contain
enough episodes of divergence from and reversion to PPP, because PPP disequilibria
may dampen very slowly. Another cause for a lack of power may be the types of tests
that are used; maybe unit-root tests are not powerful enough.
The suggestion by Frankel (1986, 1990) has resulted in two approaches to increase
the power of the tests. First, Frankel (1986) and Abuaf and Jorion (1990), among
others, use very long time series, often extending to a century. They indeed nd
evidence in favor of PPP. There is, however, some concern with these results, since the
long-horizon time series blend xed and oating rate data, and it is well-known that
real exchange rates behave very di¤erently under di¤erent exchange rate regimes (see
Mussa (1986)). This is why we use only post-Bretton-Woods data.
A second way to gain power, while using only oating data, is to analyze a panel
of many countries. Two notable studies in this eld are Frankel and Rose (1996) and
Papell (1997), which both nd evidence in favor of PPP. Recently, however, OConnell
(1998) reports that the panel evidence disappears if one takes account of the strong
cross-sectional dependence in real exchange rates. This argument does not apply to
our results, as we analyze three exchange rates univariately.
In summary, Frankels (1986, 1990) suggestion that PPP tests may lack power
because of the use of relatively short post-Bretton-Woods time series has not resulted
in conclusive evidence of PPP, despite the enormous number of studies motivated by
this suggestion.
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In the present paper we start from a di¤erent point of view. As mentioned above, the
second potential reason for a lack of power of PPP tests so far is that they are unit-root
tests, which may lack power. We investigate this claim by introducing an alternative
test for PPP. Our test is based on the Hamilton (1989) regime-switching model. The
basic idea of that model is that the expected change of a variable is one of two constants,
depending on the regime the process is in. Persistence of such mean regimes leads
to long swings in that variable. Because there is signicant evidence of such swings in
exchange rates (for instance, see Engel and Hamilton (1990), Engel (1994) and Klaassen
(1999), who reject the random walk in favor of the more general long swings model),
regime-switching models are a useful tool in exchange rate modeling.
A common feature of existing regime-switching exchange rate models is that they
do not take account of PPP. They assume that the probability of switching to the,
say, depreciation regime is constant over time, whereas PPP implies that such a switch
becomes more likely when the currency is overvalued regarding its PPP value. Thus, to
develop a test for PPP, we rst extend the basic regime-switching model by allowing the
regime-switching probabilities to depend on the PPP deviation.2 We then derive three
parameter restrictions under which the extended model implies PPP, and we test the
joint validity of these restrictions. Because this test clearly supports PPP, the reason
for the insignicant results from the unit-root tests in the existing literature is not the
absence of PPP, but rather a lack of power.
In the next section, we introduce our regime-switching model. In section 3 we
describe the data and present our empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Regime-Switching Model
In this section we develop the regime-switching model that we use to answer the two
questions of the paper, namely whether PPP holds and, if so, whether PPP disequilibria
have become shorter-lived. We rst set out the basic principles in an intuitive way. In
subsections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 we then formally develop the model in three stages, where
each stage generalizes the previous one.
The basic idea of our approach is that exchange rates exhibit two types of long
swings, for instance, an appreciation and a depreciation swing. A random process
governs the switches between the swings (or regimes). This regime-switching process is
crucial, as the variants of the model in subsections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 di¤er with respect
2Time-varying switching probabilities are also useful when modeling switches between recessions
and recoveries in the business cycle, see Durland and McCurdy (1994), Filardo (1994) and Ghysels
(1994).
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to this process only.
In the simplest model, see subsection 2.1, the probability of switching from one
regime to the other is constant over time. Hence, the level of the exchange rate is
irrelevant for the switching probabilities.
In subsection 2.2 we generalize this assumption, because it contradicts with PPP.
After all, PPP implies that switches to the, say, depreciation regime are more likely
when the currency is overvalued regarding PPP; the exchange rate is pulled towards
its PPP equilibrium. To allow for this pull, we let the regime-switching probabilities
depend on the PPP deviation. Interestingly, it appears that long-run relative PPP
holds, if the pull is present and if the swing-specic appreciation and depreciation are
strong enough compared to the PPP rate change (so that the exchange rate is able to
return to its PPP rate after an under or overvaluation, respectively). Hence, to test for
PPP, we can test whether these three conditions are fullled.
To answer the second question of the paper, about the duration of PPP disequilibria,
we need one further generalization. It is based on the idea that PPP ensures that the
long swings are around the PPP equilibrium, so that PPP disequilibria become shorter-
lived if the long swings around PPP get shorter. Therefore, in subsection 2.3 we allow
for a change in the duration of the swings and describe how to test whether this change
is negative.
In the remaining part of this section, we formally work out the intuition just given.
2.1 Regime-Switching Model Without PPP
The regime-switching model without PPP is based on Hamilton (1989). The main
di¤erence with the basic Hamilton model is that we allow for conditional heteroskedas-
ticity, which is present in the weekly data we use in the empirical application.
To describe the model, we need the following notation. Let St denote the logarithm
of the spot exchange rate at time t, that is, the domestic currency price of one unit of
foreign currency. We concentrate on the exchange rate change st=100(St¡St¡1), so
that st is the percentage depreciation of the domestic currency from time t¡1 to t.
The regime-switching model consists of four elements. Two of them, the regime
process and the mean equation, are crucial for interpreting our empirical results, as
they are directly related to the exchange rate swings. The other two, the variance and
distribution, will be discussed at the end of this subsection.
The regime process is based on two (unobservable) regimes. Let rt 2 f1; 2g denote
the regime at time t. Within this regime, the mean exchange rate change is ¹rt , which
we assume to be constant over time. Across regimes, however, the means are allowed to
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di¤er, and we identify the rst regime as the low mean regime: ¹1 · ¹2. This provides
the basis for the swings. After all, being in the rst and then in the second regime for
a while leads to a period of appreciation followed by depreciation, that is, to swings in
the exchange rate.
Whether swings are long or not depends on the regime staying probabilities. Let
pt¡1(rtjert¡1) = p(rtjIt¡1; ert¡1) denote the probability of going to regime rt at time t
conditional on the information set of the data generating process, which consists of two
parts. The rst part, It¡1, denotes the information that is observed by the econome-
trician; in this subsection It¡1 consists of (st¡1; st¡2; : : : ). The second part, ert¡1, is the
regime path (rt¡1; rt¡2; : : : ), which is not observed by the econometrician. Note that
we use the subscript t¡1 below an operator (probability, expectation or variance) as
short-hand notation for conditioning on It¡1.
As in the Hamilton (1989) model, we assume in this subsection that rt follows a
rst-order Markov process with constant staying probabilities, so that
pt¡1(rt jert¡1) = p(rt jrt¡1) =
8><>:p11 if rt = rt¡1 = 1p22 if rt = rt¡1 = 2. (1)
Hence, if p11 and p22 are high, regimes are persistent and exchange rate swings are
long. Note that in (1) the conditional probability that the current regime is low or high
depends on the past (It¡1 and ert¡1) only through the most recent regime rt¡1. This
assumption represents the only di¤erence between the current model and its general-
izations in the next two subsections.
Whereas persistence in mean regimes is supposed to take account of the long swings,
or long-run autocorrelation, there may still be short-run dynamics within a mean
regime. In the conditional mean specication we take account of this short-run au-
tocorrelation by using one autoregressive term, as it is generally believed that the
short-run autocorrelation in exchange rates is small (see West and Cho (1995)):
st = ¹rt + µ(st¡1¡¹rt¡1) + "t, (2)
where the conditional expectation of the innovation is Et¡1f"tjertg=0.
The regime process and conditional mean just specied are the most important
elements of the model. For a complete model specication, however, we also have to
dene the two other elements, namely the conditional variance and distribution. This
is done in the remaining part of this subsection.
When specifying the conditional variance of the error term in (2), Vt¡1f"tjertg, we
take account of the conditional heteroskedasticity in the weekly data that we use in
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the empirical application. We use the following generalized autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity (GARCH) type model (see Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992) for
an overview of GARCH in standard, one-regime models):
Vt¡1f"tjertg = Vt¡1f"tg = ! + ®Et¡1f"2t¡1g+ ¯Vt¡2f"t¡1g. (3)
Note that we set Vt¡1f"tjertg equal to its expectation conditional on only It¡1, Vt¡1f"tg.
This is only for the sake of estimation simplicity.3 We admit that it is a restriction.
However, the only purpose of the variance specication is to make the PPP results,
which we are mainly interested in, robust to conditional heteroskedasticity. Subsection
3.4 shows that (3) is su¢cient for that.
We complete the conditional variance specication by imposing the usual GARCH
restrictions ! > 0 and ®, ¯¸ 0 to ensure Vt¡1f"tg > 0 for all t. We also assume that
®+¯<1, so that the unconditional variance is ¾2 = !1¡®¡¯ .
The fourth and nal element of our model, the conditional error distribution, is
specied by a t-distribution, which is often used to allow for extra leptokurtosis (see
Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992)). It has º degrees of freedom, zero mean, and
variance Vt¡1f"tg:
"t jIt¡1; ert » t (º ; 0 ; Vt¡1f"tg) . (4)
This completes the regime-switching model without PPP; it is given by (1) to (4).
2.2 Regime-Switching Model With PPP
In this subsection we extend the model of the previous subsection, so as to be able to
test whether (long-run relative) PPP holds. We rst examine the implications of PPP
for the model and show why the model needs some extension. The required extension
turns out to deal with the regime-staying probabilities in (1) only. Having described
the implications of PPP, we then show that these implications also imply PPP, so that
a test on their joint validity delivers a test for PPP. Finally, we give the test statistic
that we will use in the empirical study.
3 If we had not set Vt¡1f"tjertg = Vt¡1f"tg, the variance would have been Vt¡1f"tjertg = !+®"2t¡1+
¯Vt¡2f"t¡1jert¡1g and would have depended on the entire regime path up to time t¡1. After all, rt¡1
and rt¡2 would have a¤ected the variance through the surprise term "2t¡1, which is fst¡1 ¡ [¹rt¡1 +
µ(st¡2¡¹rt¡2)]g2 expressed in the conditioning variables, and earlier regimes would have a¤ected the
variance through the earlier surprise terms implicitly present in the lagged variance term. This would
have rendered estimation intractable, since the number of possible regime paths is enormous and all
regime paths have to be integrated out for estimation, as they are not observed. Specication (3)
circumvents this problem by directly averaging out the regimes rt¡1 and rt¡2 in the source of the
path-dependence, "2t¡1. The basic idea of this technique originates from Gray (1996a) and is further
discussed by Klaassen (1999).
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According to PPP, the deviation of the exchange rate St from the PPP exchange
rate Spppt , being the (logarithm of the) home price level over the foreign price level,
is constant in the long-run. Therefore, if the current PPP deviation is higher (lower)
than this constant, the PPP deviation is expected to fall (rise) in the long run.
In the regime-switching model, this has three implications. First, to make a fall in
the PPP deviation possible, the expected change ¹1 in the low mean regime must, of
course, be smaller than the expected depreciation of the PPP rate, ¹ppp, say. Similarly,
to make a rise in the PPP deviation possible, ¹2 must exceed ¹ppp; this is the second
implication of PPP.
The third implication concerns the regime process. In the model without PPP, the
regime-staying probabilities (1) are constant over time. However, this is unrealistic if
PPP holds. After all, if the current PPP deviation is, say, higher than the long-run
constant, the probability of going to the low mean regime increases, so as to swing the
process back into the direction of its PPP equilibrium. Hence, a large PPP deviation
makes the probability of staying in the low mean regime higher, whereas staying in the
high mean regime becomes less likely.
To model this dependence of the regime-staying probabilities on the PPP deviation,




t¡1)) if rt = rt¡1 = 1
¤(±2 ¡ ±ppp(St¡1¡Spppt¡1)) if rt = rt¡1 = 2,
(5)
where ¤(:) is the standard logistic distribution function.4 For parsimony, we restrict
the e¤ect of the PPP deviation to be the same (in absolute sense) for both probabilities,
so that a single parameter, ±ppp, captures the e¤ect of PPP. This parameter is positive
if PPP holds, and it measures the strength with which the exchange rate is pulled
towards PPP equilibrium. Note that for ±ppp = 0 the staying probabilities are simply
¤(±1) and ¤(±2), which correspond to p11 and p22 in (1), respectively.
So far, we have concentrated on the implications of PPP for the regime-switching
model: ±ppp > 0 is the necessary pull towards equilibrium, and ¹1 < ¹ppp < ¹2 is
necessary for PPP because otherwise the exchange rate will move away from PPP
even if ±ppp > 0. To get a test for PPP, however, we need to know what these three
restrictions tell us about PPP. In appendix A we show through simulations that the
restrictions imply that PPP holds. Hence, one can test the null of no PPP by testing
the joint null of ¹1 ¸ ¹ppp or ¹ppp ¸ ¹2 or ±ppp · 0, which is the complement of the
4As opposed to the model without PPP, the information set of the econometrician, It¡1, now consists
of the previous exchange rate and PPP rate levels. As before, the information of the data generating
process also contains the regime path.
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three restrictions mentioned above. Given the existing literature, as described in the
introduction, this is a new way to test for PPP. In the remaining part of this subsection,
we develop the test statistic we use in subsection 3.2 of our empirical study.
We assume for simplicity that the expected PPP depreciation, ¹ppp, is given. This
makes the null only depend on the vector ¼=(¹1; ¹2; ±ppp)
0 of parameters of the regime-
switching model. Since the null consists of several inequality constraints on ¼, we
dene our test statistic along the lines of Kodde and Palm (1986). That is, we use the
distance from the data, represented by the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate b¼ of ¼,
to the closest feasible point under the null (see appendix C for a description of the ML
estimation procedure). More formally, our PPP test statistic is
b¦ = min
¼2H0
(b¼¡¼)0 bV fb¼g¡1(b¼¡¼), (6)
where H0 is the set of feasible vectors ¼ under the null, and bV fb¼g is the ML estimate
for the variance of b¼.
Denition (6) shows that b¦ ¸ 0 and that only points b¼ =2 H0 lead to b¦ > 0. To
determine whether a realization of b¦ is su¢ciently positive to reject the null, we need
the distribution of b¦ under the null. However, we cannot use the theory in Kodde and
Palm (1986) for that. After all, under the null of no PPP, the PPP deviation St¡1¡Spppt¡1
in the regime-staying probabilities (5) is non-stationary, making the distribution of b¼
and hence b¦ potentially non-standard. Therefore, we simulate the null distribution ofb¦. Appendix B describes the simulation procedure that we use for our empirical study.
2.3 Duration of PPP Disequilibria
Having extended the basic regime-switching model with the allowance for PPP, we
need one further extension to be able to examine the second issue of the paper, namely
whether PPP disequilibria, being the di¤erence between PPP deviations and their long
run constant value, have become shorter-lived. Of course, this question is only relevant
if PPP holds. Therefore, the current subsection is conditional on this. As in the
previous subsection, we rst extend the model to allow for a change in the duration of
PPP disequilibria, and then we present the test that we use in the empirical study.
In the regime-switching model with PPP, the duration of PPP disequilibria changes
if the duration of the swings around PPP changes. Since the latter depends on the in-




t¡1) + ±11dt¡1) if rt = rt¡1 = 1
¤(±20 ¡ ±ppp(St¡1¡Spppt¡1) + ±21dt¡1) if rt = rt¡1 = 2,
(7)
8
where dt is one if time t is after the break date and zero otherwise.
To complete (7), we have to choose the break date. Of course, such a choice is
rather ad hoc. However, from an economic point of view, the Louvre accord of February
22, 1987 is an interesting break date. After all, the Louvre accord exactly aimed at
stabilizing exchange rates by introducing target zones, so as to prevent the long dollar
swings of the years before. Therefore, negative values for ±11 and ±21 in (7) represent
that PPP disequilibria have become shorter-lived after the Louvre accord.
To test whether ±11 and ±21 are negative, we use their ML-based t-values. These
t-values have standard (normal) limit distributions, because St¡1¡Spppt¡1 is stationary
in case of PPP. Hence, one can use standard inference. Subsection 3.3 presents the
results.
3 Empirical Results
In this section we use the regime-switching model of section 2 to answer the two ques-
tions of this paper, namely whether relative PPP holds in the long-run and whether
PPP disequilibria have become shorter-lived. First, we describe the data. Then, in
subsection 3.2 we test for PPP and in 3.3 we examine the duration of PPP disequilib-
ria. In subsection 3.4 we check the specication of our model. In the last subsection,
we analyze whether taking account of PPP leads to better exchange rate forecasts than
the simple random walk model.
3.1 Data
We use three U.S. dollar exchange rates, namely, the dollar vis-à-vis the German mark,
the Japanese yen and the British pound. These exchange rates have been chosen
because of their important role on foreign exchange markets and because they behave
relatively independently, for instance, compared to dollar-EMS exchange rates. We
take weekly instead of monthly or quarterly data, because Klaassen (1999) nds for
the same series and model strategy that only weekly data yield enough observations to
signicantly distinguish a long swings process from a random walk, and because our
central parameter ±ppp, measuring the strength with which swings are pulled towards
PPP, is only identied if there are swings. The data set contains 1,216 observations for
the percentage dollar depreciations st from April 2, 1974 to July 22, 1997.
To construct the PPP exchange rates Spppt , we follow most of the literature by
using consumer price indices from the IMF International Financial Statistics.5 They
5We use a cubic spline function to generate weekly PPP rates from the available monthly rates. The
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have been obtained from Datastream, just as the exchange rates. In the remaining part
of this subsection, we analyze the characteristics of the three exchange rates and PPP
rates and use them to motivate our model specication.
In panel A of gures 1, 2 and 3, we show the behavior of the three actual and
PPP exchange rates over the sample period (in U.S. dollars, not in logarithms). At
rst sight, exchange rates seem to be characterized by long swings. This impression is
formally tested for the same data by Klaassen (1999), and he indeed nds that long
swings are part of the exchange rate generating process. This motivates the use of a
regime-switching model.
The gures also suggest that exchange rates swing around PPP and that the swings
are likely to end when the deviation from the PPP rate is large. Therefore, it seems
useful to let the regime-switching probabilities depend on the PPP deviations, as our
model does.
Finally, we see from the plots that the swings for the two European currencies seem
to be shorter in the second half of the sample. This shows that there may well have
been a break in the duration of the swings. Our model allows for that.
In table 1 we report some descriptive statistics of the three exchange rate changes.
There is signicant rst-order autocorrelation in the weekly German mark changes (we
always use a signicance level of 5%). Estimates for higher-order autocorrelations are
not reported separately, but are combined in Box-Pierce type statistics eQ10. They show
that higher-order autoregressive terms in the mean equation (2) are unnecessary.
Table 1 also presents two autocorrelation tests for the squared exchange rate changes.
Both tests point at conditional heteroskedasticity for all three series. This is why we
have extended the basic Hamilton (1989) regime-switching model with GARCH speci-
cation (3) for the conditional error variance.
3.2 Does Relative Purchasing Power Parity Hold in the Long Run?
In this subsection we use the theory of 2.2 to answer the central question of the paper.
That is, we compute the PPP statistic b¦ in (6) to test the null of no PPP using the
estimation results for the regime-switching model with PPP.6
The results for b¦ [and its p-value] are: 5.46 [0.01] for Germany, 3.14 [0.05] for Japan,
interpolation method one chooses is practically irrelevant for the results, because PPP rates are much
more stable than actual exchange rates. For convenience, we add a constant to the price index ratios
such that the average PPP deviation is zero.
6Because the estimation results for the model of subsection 2.2 are similar to the ones for the model
of 2.3 with the post-Louvre dummy (to be discussed below), we do not report the estimation results of
the former model to save space.
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and 4.61 [0.01] for the U.K.7 Hence, we nd evidence in favor of long-run relative PPP
for all three U.S. dollar exchange rates over the post-Bretton-Woods period of oating.
Given that the existing literature is not very supportive for PPP, it is remarkable that
we nd such conclusive evidence with our new test. This shows that the results in
the literature so far are not due to the absence of PPP. Apparently, the unit-root
type tests that are commonly used are not powerful enough given the relatively short
post-Bretton-Woods data period.
The existence of PPP has important implications for the exchange rate swings.
More specically, exchange rate swings are more likely to end when the PPP deviation
is large (see subsection 2.2). To illustrate this e¤ect, gure 1D contains the ex ante
probability of being in the high mean regime for Germany for the regime-switching
models with and without PPP from 1981 to the beginning of 1986.8 According to
the model without PPP, the temporary upward moves between 1982 and 1985 are
interpreted as signs of a regime-shift. However, some weeks later, it appears that there
has been no such shift, and the ex ante probabilities become low again. The regime
probabilities of the model with PPP are much less a¤ected by the temporary upward
moves in the early eighties. However, when the PPP deviation gets larger, their e¤ect
increases, showing that the long swing is about to end.
3.3 Have PPP Disequilibria Become Shorter-Lived?
From the previous subsection, we know that the PPP deviation is constant in the
long run. In the short run, however, there are considerable periods in which the PPP
deviation is di¤erent from this constant. In the current subsection we examine whether
such PPP disequilibria have become shorter-lived, the second theme of the paper. We
use the theory of subsection 2.3.
As argued in 2.3, we test for a change in the duration of PPP disequilibria by testing
whether the swings around the PPP rate get shorter after the Louvre accord in 1987.
More formally, we test whether the parameters ±11 and ±21 for the post-Louvre dummy
7Appendix B describes how we have simulated the p-values. It also argues that these p-values are
conservative, that is, they are likely somewhat higher than the true p-values. However, in our case this
is no problem, as the reported p-values are already low.
At rst sight, it may be surprising that the p-values are so low given that the b¦ are not very large.
After all, for a test on a single one-sided restriction in a standard setting of all stationary variables,
the asymptotic 5% critical value is 1:652 = 2:71, where 1.65 is the 5% quantile of the standard normal
distribution, and this value generally increases when non-stationary variables are involved. However,
in our case the alternative hypothesis of PPP consists of three instead of a single one-sided restriction,
and this has a negative e¤ect on the critical value.
8The ex ante regime probability for time t is dened as the conditional probability that the process
is in a particular regime at time t using only the information set of the econometrician at time t ¡ 1,
that is, It¡1 (see Gray (1996a)).
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in (7) are negative. The results follow from table 3, which presents the estimates of
all parameters in our model, as well as two benchmark models, namely the random
walk and the regime-switching model without PPP. The table demonstrates that PPP
disequilibria have become shorter-lived for the two European currencies, as three out
of four coe¢cients for the post-Louvre dummy are signicantly negative. However, we
nd no evidence of shorter PPP disequilibria for the yen.
The shorter duration of PPP disequilibria for the European currencies may be
caused by attempts to stabilize exchange rates, such as the Louvre accord. Another
reason may be the increased openness of countries. For instance, the ratio of total
trade over output, which is often used as a measure for openness, has increased over
our period of observation 1974-1997 from 0.42 to 0.58 for Germany and from 0.41 to
0.64 for the U.K.9
The shorter duration of PPP disequilibria is graphically illustrated by gures 1C
and 3C, which plot the smoothed regime probabilities of being in the high mean regime
for Germany and the U.K., respectively.10 For both exchange rates we observe more,
but much shorter swings after 1987, so that the exchange rates do not move far away
from their PPP rates. For the U.K. the increased stability makes it even di¢cult to
classify the observations after 1987 into one particular regime, which leads to the fairly
unstable smoothed regime plot.
The second conclusion mentioned above, the lack of evidence of shorter PPP dise-
quilibria for Japan, is in contrast with the conclusions for the two European currencies.
This is, however, not surprising, because the Japanese economy is still quite closed,
at least compared to Germany and the U.K., as the trade/output ratio has increased
from 0.17 in 1974 to only 0.25 in 1997. This makes Japanese economic policy more
independent, so that PPP disequilibria can be more persistent.
3.4 Diagnostics
The results of the two previous subsections are all based on a regime-switching model.
In this subsection, we check the specication of that model in two ways, namely by
9The underlying total trade (exports plus imports) and output gures are from the OECD Main
Economic Indicators in Datastream.
10The di¤erence between the smoothed regime probability at time t and the ex ante probability, as
dened in footnote 8, is that the former probability uses the complete data set IT instead of only It¡1,
thereby smoothing the ex ante probabilities. Hence, the smoothed regime probability gives the most
informative answer to the question which regime the process was likely in at time t. In appendix D we
show how to compute the smoothed probabilities in a recursive manner. The algorithm is based on Gray
(1996b). It links the ex ante probabilities, which are used during estimation (see appendix C), directly
to the smoothed probabilities by iterating forward from the ex ante to the smoothed probabilities.
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testing whether the model takes account of all autocorrelation and conditional het-
eroskedasticity in the data. We use the normalized residuals for that.
Table 4 presents the test results, not only for our preferred model, but also for the
two benchmark models introduced before. From the rst-order autocorrelations and
the Box-Pierce statistics Q10, we conclude that there is no remaining autocorrelation, at
least for the two regime-switching models. Furthermore, the rst-order autocorrelation
and the aggregate autocorrelation test Qs10 for the squared normalized residuals show
no reason to extend the variance specications of the three models.
3.5 Forecasting Performance
Knowing that PPP holds and that PPP disequilibria have become shorter-lived for
Germany and the U.K., we now examine whether this can be exploited to predict
future exchange rates better than a random walk.
We rst compare the in-sample and then the out-of-sample forecasts generated by
the random walk and the regime-switching model with and without PPP. We examine
both point predictions and predictions of the direction of the exchange rate change by
comparing the actual (logarithm of the) exchange rate level at some future time ¿ , S¿ ,
with the predicted level based on information available at time t¡1, bEt¡1fS¿g. For the
random walk, this forecast is the previous exchange rate St¡1 plus an estimated drift
term. For the regime-switching model, bEt¡1fS¿g follows from (17) in appendix E, after
substitution of the estimation results of table 3. The forecasts are computed for three
horizons, namely the one-week horizon, which corresponds to the data frequency, the
one-quarter (13-week), and the one-year (52-week) horizon.
Starting with the in-sample forecasts, the rst, often-used forecasting statistics




t=1(S¿¡ bEt¡1fS¿g)2, and the mean absolute error (MAE) 1T PTt=1 ¯̄̄S¿ ¡ bEt¡1fS¿g¯̄̄.
Table 5 presents their values. They show that our regime-switching model with PPP-
based switching probabilities beats both the random walk and the regime-switching
model without PPP in 14 out of 18 cases. The four cases where it is not the best model
are all for the yen. This currency has only very few swings within our sample, so that
it is not surprising that regime-switching forecasts and forecasts from a random walk
are of about equal quality.
Although there is a slight preference for our regime-switching model according to
the RMSE and MAE, our model clearly outperforms the other models at predicting the
direction of change. In all nine cases the estimated probability of a correct prediction
is higher than for the two other models. Moreover, in all cases our model predicts the
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direction of change correctly in signicantly more than half of the observations, while
for the random walk this happens in only one case.11 This outperformance can be
attributed to two features. First, the long swings improve the forecast quality, as the
regime-switching model without PPP already outperforms the random walk in eight
cases. Second, the allowance for PPP in the switching probabilities leads to additional
predictive power. This holds particularly at long horizons, which is in line with the
fact that PPP is a long-run phenomenon.
We now turn to the out-of-sample forecasts. We reestimate the two models using
only the rst three quarters of the sample. Holding the parameters xed, we then use
the 304 observations in the nal quarter (from November 1, 1991 to July 22, 1997) to
generate the forecasts bEt¡1fS¿g.
From table 6 we see that the superiority of our regime-switching model with PPP-
based switching probabilities has vanished, at least in terms of RMSE and MAE. In
only four out of eighteen cases our model outperforms both other models (in the other
cases it does at least worse than the random walk). Especially for Japan our model
seems to do badly. This has the same reason as given above: the swings in the yen-
dollar rate are so long that there are only three switches in the in-sample period (see
gure 2C). Because such switches are crucial for identifying the switching-probability
parameters, the parameter estimates di¤er substantially from the ones based on the
complete sample. Hence, more data are needed for the yen to give our model a fair
chance.
Concentrating on the European currencies only, the fact that our model does not
outperform the random walk may, again, be due to the rather low number of regime-
switches in the in-sample period. However, it may also indicate that it is indeed di¢cult
to beat the random walk in point prediction, as Diebold and Nason (1990) conclude
from their nonparametric analysis.
Notwithstanding this result, we do nd that our model outperforms the random
walk at predicting the direction of change, particularly at longer horizons. The outper-
formance is partly due to the long swings, as the regime-switching model without PPP
does already better than the random walk. Engel (1994) also reports this latter result,
but he nds that the outperformance is particularly at the short-run. Our model with
PPP-based switching probabilities, however, does particularly well at longer horizons,
11These conclusions about signicance are robust to the autocorrelation originating from the fact
that for the one-quarter and one-year horizon the forecast horizon exceeds the one week period be-
tween observations. The standard errors of the percentages are based on the Newey and West (1987)
asymptotic covariance matrix. Following West and Cho (1995), we have taken Bartlett weights and
have used the same data-dependent automatic lag selection rule. This rule, introduced by Newey and
West (1994), has certain asymptotic optimality properties.
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likely because PPP is a long-run phenomenon. The in-sample forecasting results led to
the same conclusion.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the popular hypothesis of purchasing power parity (PPP),
more specically, long-run relative PPP. The main contribution of the paper is that
we nd evidence in favor of PPP for the three worlds main U.S. dollar exchange rates
over the post-Bretton-Woods period, namely the dollar vis-à-vis the German mark,
Japanese yen and U.K. pound. This evidence is remarkable, because the extensive
existing literature is not very supportive for PPP. The reason for this di¤erence is that
we use a new test. It is based on a regime-switching model, in which regime-switching
probabilities depend on the PPP deviation.
Given the existence of PPP, we can also examine the reasons behind PPP. Our
results support the view that goods arbitrage is one of the factors underlying PPP, as
we nd that PPP disequilibria have become shorter-lived for those countries (Germany
and the U.K.) that have the largest increase in trade over the period of observation.
Our third result is that the existence of long-run PPP makes the predictions of the
direction of exchange rate changes generated by our model better than those from the
popular random walk model, particularly many periods ahead. The relative perfor-
mance in point prediction, however, is not yet clear, because the post-Bretton-Woods
data period is too short compared to the length of the swings to get su¢ciently accurate
in-sample estimates for the regime-switching parameters. This problem can be reduced
by pooling several exchange rate series in a panel data set and then imposing some
cross-sectional parameter restrictions to increase estimation accuracy. This is left for
future research.
Our model can be extended and applied in various ways. Firstly, other variables
such as forward rates can be included in the mean equation to improve exchange rate
forecasts. Secondly, variables as the trade balance or monetary policy indicators may
be informative about regime-switches, so that it may prove useful to include them
besides the PPP deviation in the regime-switching probabilities. Thirdly, although we
have shown that regime-switching models can provide a framework for testing long-run
PPP, they may also be useful to test other long-run relationships. For instance, to
test the long-run quantity theory of money, stating that the price level is proportional
to the money supply in the long term. Hence, regime-switching models may o¤er an
alternative for unit-root and cointegration tests that are commonly employed to test
for long-run relations. These issues are left for future research.
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Appendices
A If ¹1 < ¹ppp < ¹2 and ±ppp > 0, then PPP holds
In subsection 2.2 we have claimed that ¹1 < ¹ppp < ¹2 and ±ppp > 0 imply PPP. In this
appendix, we verify that claim. For that, we rst express PPP in more formal terms.
In words, the theory of (long-run relative) PPP states that the PPP deviation is
constant in the long-run. Of course, constancy is a very strict requirement. One usually
means that the mean and variance of the PPP deviation are constant in the long-run
and that the respective constants are independent of the current situation. We follow
this interpretation. Therefore, PPP formally means that both Et¡1fS¿ ¡ Sppp¿ jert¡1g
and Vt¡1fS¿ ¡ Sppp¿ jert¡1g converge (for ¿ ! 1) to a limit that is independent of the
conditioning information It¡1 and ert¡1, that is, the paths of exchange rates, PPP rates
and regimes up to time t¡1.
Because we have not yet succeeded to derive a formal proof for our claim that
¹1 < ¹ppp < ¹2 and ±ppp > 0 imply PPP, we use a simulation experiment to show that
it is very likely true.12 This experiment consists of two parts. First, we demonstrate for
one particular value of the initial exchange rate level St¡1 and the initial PPP deviation
St¡1¡Spppt¡1, which are the only parts of It¡1 that we use in our simulation experiment,
that under the three constraints Et¡1fS¿¡Sppp¿ jert¡1g and Vt¡1fS¿¡Sppp¿ jert¡1g converge
to a limit that is independent of the initial regime rt¡1, the only relevant part of ert¡1.
In the second part, we show that the two limits are also independent of the initial
exchange rate and PPP deviation.
To verify the rst part of our claim, we simulate both moments Et¡1fS¿¡Sppp¿ jert¡1g
and Vt¡1fS¿ ¡ Sppp¿ jert¡1g for horizons one to 2,000 time periods and check our claim
graphically. For that, we generate two data sets of 100,000 series of 2,000 future PPP
deviations S¿ ¡Sppp¿ . All series of both data sets start from St¡1=0 and St¡1¡Spppt¡1=0,
and all series within the rst (second) data set are based on rt¡1 equal to one (two).
The simulated value of Et¡1fS¿ ¡ Sppp¿ jert¡1g (Vt¡1fS¿ ¡ Sppp¿ jert¡1g) is dened as the
mean (variance) of the 100,000 drawings of the future PPP deviation. In gures 4A and
B, the two curves labeled ±ppp > 0 plot these simulated mean and variance, respectively,
for all horizons. It is clear that Et¡1fS¿ ¡ Sppp¿ jert¡1g and Vt¡1fS¿ ¡ Sppp¿ jert¡1g indeed
12The reported simulation results are based on the following parameter values for the exchange rate
process: ¹1=¡0:2, ¹2=0:2, ½=0, !=2:5, ®=0, ¯=0, º=1 and (±10; ±11; ±20; ±21; ±ppp)=(7; 0; 7; 0; 10)
(the symmetry is only for the ease of interpretation). Moreover, the process for the PPP exchange rate
is the random walk sppp¿ =100(S
ppp
¿ ¡Sppp¿¡1) = ¹ppp+ ´¿ , where ¹ppp=0:05 and ´¿ is standard normally
distributed. We have tried various other combinations, each satisfying ¹1 < ¹ppp < ¹2 and ±ppp > 0,
and all yield essentially the same results.
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converge to a limit that does not depend on rt¡1 and, therefore, not on ert¡1.
For comparison, gures 4A and B also contain the simulated moments in case the
parameters do not satisfy the joint restrictions ¹1 < ¹ppp < ¹2 and ±ppp > 0. Since
it is obvious that Et¡1fS¿ ¡ Sppp¿ jert¡1g and Vt¡1fS¿ ¡ Sppp¿ jert¡1g do not converge if
the interval of regime-specic exchange rate means does not contain the PPP trend,
¹ppp =2 (¹1; ¹2), we only concentrate on ±ppp · 0.13 Suppose rst that ±ppp=0. In that
case the PPP deviation is expected to diverge, since the symmetry implied by ¹1=¡¹2
and ±10 = ±20 (see footnote 12) ensures that the expected exchange rate is constant
in the long run, while the expected PPP rate rises. Second, the case ±ppp < 0 also
implies a diverging PPP deviation, because moving away from the PPP rate increases
the probability of staying in that situation, so that the exchange rate is expected to
get stuck in one regime after a while.
In the second part of the simulation experiment, we have to demonstrate that the
limits of Et¡1fS¿ ¡ Sppp¿ jert¡1g and Vt¡1fS¿ ¡ Sppp¿ jert¡1g do not depend on the initial
condition It¡1, that is, on St¡1 and St¡1¡Spppt¡1, as argued before. For that, we regress
100,000 simulated values of S¿ ¡ Sppp¿ and (S¿ ¡ Sppp¿ )2 on randomly generated St¡1
and St¡1 ¡ Spppt¡1 and their squares for various future times ¿ (both initial values are
generated from the uniform distribution on (-0.5,0.5)). We nd that for horizons up
to about 1,000 the initial condition matters, but that for longer horizons it does not.14
Hence, the limits of Et¡1fS¿¡Sppp¿ jert¡1g and Vt¡1fS¿¡Sppp¿ jert¡1g indeed do not depend
on It¡1. Together with the conclusion from the rst part of our simulation study, that
both limits exist and do not depend on ert¡1, this shows that ¹1 < ¹ppp < ¹2 and
±ppp > 0 indeed imply that PPP holds.
B P-values for PPP Tests
To decide whether the realized PPP tests b¦ in subsection 3.2 are signicant, we need
the p-values. In this appendix we describe how we simulate them.
We generate 1,000 data sets, each containing one series of exchange rate levels St
13The reported results are based on (±10; ±11; ±20; ±21; ±ppp) = (4; 0; 4; 0; 0) and (10; 0; 10; 0;¡1).
14The White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust F-tests for no e¤ect of St¡1, S2t¡1, St¡1 ¡ Spppt¡1 and
(St¡1¡Spppt¡1)2 on S¿ ¡Sppp¿ and (S¿ ¡Sppp¿ )2 for horizons 100, 500, 1000, 1500 and 2000 are as follows.
For S¿ ¡ Sppp¿ as dependent variable: 2¢104 [p-value is 0.00], 9¢101 [0.00], 1.08 [0.36], 0.64 [0.63], and
1.38 [0.24], respectively. For (S¿ ¡ Sppp¿ )2 as dependent variable: 7¢103 [0.00], 4¢101 [0.00], 2.46 [0.04],
0.68 [0.61], and 1.27 [0.28], respectively.
To verify that this gradual disappearance of the e¤ect of the initial condition is not caused by mis-
specication of the linear regression model, we run a nonparametric regression (see Härdle and Linton
(1994)) of S¿ ¡ Sppp¿ on St¡1 and St¡1 ¡ Spppt¡1 separately for the horizons just mentioned. The results,
which are available from the author upon request, support our claim.
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and one of PPP rate levels Spppt . Both series are generated independently (±ppp = 0),
so that the data satisfy the null restriction of no PPP; a detailed description of the
processes underlying both series follows below. For each data set, we then estimate
the regime-switching model with PPP, but without breaks in the duration of PPP
deviations, thus (5) allowing for ±ppp 6= 0. This procedure yields 1,000 values for the
PPP test statistic b¦ in (6). The p-values for the three b¦ that we estimate from the
real data are the fraction of simulated b¦ that exceed them.
We now discuss the 1,000 generated series of St and S
ppp
t in more detail. The length
of both series is 1,217 time periods, the same as the length of the level series in the real
data. Hence, our simulated p-values account for potential small-sample biases.
The process for St is the regime-switching process without PPP, as described in
subsection 2.1. The true parameter values underlying each of the 1,000 series are the
averages of the parameter estimates of the model without PPP for Germany, Japan
and the U.K. (we will analyze the sensitivity of the p-values to this choice below).15
The process starts from S0=0.
The process for Spppt is a normal random walk with drift. As the PPP process is
independent of the exchange rate process, it is not obvious how we should choose the
values of the drift parameter ¹ppp. After all, if ¹ppp equals Efstg, then St and Spppt
seem to be related through their common trend, so that one will nd many large values
of simulated b¦ and thus a large p-value for the realized b¦, so that it becomes more
di¢cult to reject the null. On the other hand, if ¹ppp is outside the interval (¹1; ¹2),
then the simulated b¦ will very often be zero, leading to a low p-value for the realizedb¦ and to an easier rejection of the null. To get an objective value for ¹ppp, we use the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF. We rst construct the PPP rates
for all countries of which the IFS contains the consumer price index. For each of these
138 PPP rates, we then estimate ¹ppp and the corresponding variance ¾
2
ppp. A randomly
selected pair of these two estimates is taken as the true parameter pair underlying one
of the 1,000 Spppt series. The process starts from S
ppp
0 =0.
A problem with this approach of generating Spppt is that the OECD countries are
relatively overrepresented in the IFS. Since OECD countries have quite stable PPP
rates, this leads to too many ¹ppp close to zero. Hence, ¹ppp is too often close to Efstg,
which is ¡0:01 for the true parameters for the St process.16 As explained above, this
similarity between ¹ppp and Efstg makes the simulated p-values too high, so that it is
15As can be veried from table 3, these averages are ¹1 = ¡0:29, ¹2 = 0:14, µ = 0:03, ¾2 = 2:51,
®=0:10, ¯=0:88, º¡1=0:19, p11=0:983 and p22=0:990.
16 See footnote 15, using that Efstg = p1¹1+(1¡ p1)¹2, where the unconditional regime probability
p1 = (1¡ p22)=(2¡ p11 ¡ p22), as derived by Hamilton (1989).
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more di¢cult to reject the null.
Having described the simulation procedure, we can now present the simulated p-
values that we need in the main text. The column labeled Basic case in table 2 shows
that they are 0.00 for Germany, 0.05 for Japan, and 0.01 for the U.K. Taking account
of the fact that these simulated p-values likely overestimate the true ones, we conclude
that the PPP test b¦ is signicant for all three exchange rates.
A potential problem with the p-values is that they are based on one specic set of
true parameters for the exchange rate process and that the p-values are likely sensitive
to that choice. First, if the parameters are changed such that Efstg is more similar to
¹ppp, then the p-values will rise, as argued above. Second, if ¹2¡¹1 is made smaller, ¹ppp
will more often be outside (¹1; ¹2), thereby decreasing the p-values. In the remaining
part of this appendix, we demonstrate that this sensitivity indeed exists, but that it is
not problematic for our conclusion of rejecting the null.
To examine the sensitivity, we compute the p-values for several combinations of
nuisance parameters Efstg and ¹2¡¹1, while using the same Spppt series as before. The
combinations are Efstg = ¡0:1; 0; 0:1 with ¹2¡¹1 held constant at 0:4 (to study the
sensitivity regarding Efstg), and ¹2¡¹1 = 0:2; 0:4; 0:6 with Efstg constant at 0 (to
study the sensitivity with respect to ¹2¡¹1). These seem reasonable values given the
estimates for the model without PPP in table 3, which imply that ( bEfstg; b¹2¡b¹1) is
(0:01; 0:42) for Germany, (¡0:05; 0:43) for Japan, and (0:01; 0:44) for the U.K.
Table 2 reports the p-values corresponding to each combination of nuisance para-
meters. It is clear that the p-values are indeed sensitive to both Efstg and ¹2¡¹1.
However, the results also show that this sensitivity is not problematic for our rejection
of the null of no PPP. That is, even in the worst case the largest simulated p-value (for
Japan) is quite small (0.09), particularly if one takes into account that the simulated
p-values overestimate the true ones, as argued above.
C Estimation
We estimate the regime-switching model introduced in section 2 by maximum like-
lihood. In this appendix, we derive the likelihood function and show that it has a
convenient recursive structure.
To obtain the likelihood function, we rst need the density of the exchange rate
change at time t conditional on observable information. Let pt¡1(st) denote this density
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pt¡1(st jrt; rt¡1) ¢ pt¡1(rt; rt¡1). (8)
We now discuss how to compute both terms on the right-hand-side.
The rst term, pt¡1(st jrt; rt¡1), denotes the density of the exchange rate change at
time t evaluated at the value st conditional on It¡1 and on the current and previous
regimes having values rt and rt¡1, respectively. This t-density follows from formulas
(2), (3) and (4). It is, however, not straightforward how to compute the conditional
variance in (3), as this requires integrating out the regimes rt¡1 and rt¡2 in "2t¡1 =
fst¡1 ¡ [¹rt¡1 + µ(st¡2¡¹rt¡2)]g2. For that, we need pt¡1(rt¡1; rt¡2), the conditional
probability that the two most recent regimes have values rt¡1 and rt¡2. This probability
is crucial, since all regime probabilities in the paper can be derived from it. Using
similar techniques as in Gray (1996a), we now show that this probability has a rst-
order recursive structure, which simplies its computation a lot.
First, we write pt¡1(rt¡1; rt¡2) as
pt¡1(rt¡1; rt¡2) = pt¡2(rt¡1; rt¡2 jSpppt¡1; st¡1)
= pt¡2(rt¡1; rt¡2 jst¡1) ¢ pt¡2(S
ppp
t¡1 jrt¡1; rt¡2; st¡1)
pt¡2(Spppt¡1 jst¡1)
. (9)
This equation can be simplied by assuming that the ratio on the right-hand-side
is one. That is, the information contained in the two recent exchange rate regimes is
irrelevant for the distribution of Spppt¡1 once all PPP levels through t¡2 and all exchange
rate levels through t¡1 are known. This is reasonable, since the price levels underlying
Spppt are almost xed in the short run. Given this assumption, we have
pt¡1(rt¡1; rt¡2) =
pt¡2(st¡1 jrt¡1; rt¡2) ¢ pt¡2(rt¡1; rt¡2)
pt¡2(st¡1)
=




Hence, the variables to compute pt¡1(rt¡1; rt¡2) are its previous values pt¡2(rt¡2; rt¡3)
for rt¡3=1; 2, the previous switching probability pt¡2(rt¡1jrt¡2) and the previous densi-
ties pt¡2(st¡1 jrt¡1; rt¡2) and pt¡2(st¡1). This makes the computation of pt¡1(rt¡1; rt¡2)
a rst-order recursive process.
17We use the same symbol pt¡1 for several densities (see (1) and (8)). The specic meaning of pt¡1 is
uniquely determined by the symbols we use in its argument. This results in a concise notation, which
will prove useful in the remaining part of the paper.
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The second term on the right-hand-side in (8), pt¡1(rt; rt¡1), is the conditional
probability that the current and previous regimes have values rt and rt¡1, respectively.
It can be calculated from




where pt¡1(rt jrt¡1) follows from (7) and pt¡1(rt¡1; rt¡2) is given by (10).
Having discussed both terms on the right-hand-side of (8), we can now compute the
density of interest, pt¡1(st), being a mixture of four t-densities. This density can then
be used to build the sample log-likelihood
PT
t=1 log(pt¡1(st)) with which all parameters
in the regime-switching model can be estimated.
From a practical point of view, it is important to realize that the log-likelihood
has a second-order recursive structure, similar to that of a standard one-regime AR(1)-
GARCH(1,1) model. After all, for (11) one needs the current regime-switching prob-
ability pt¡1(rt j rt¡1) and the rst-order recursive probability pt¡1(rt¡1; rt¡2) for all
eight combinations of (rt; rt¡1; rt¡2); density (8) can then be computed from (11), the
previous changes st¡1 and st¡2, (10) and the previous variance Vt¡2f"t¡1g in (3). This
second-order recursiveness of pt¡1(st) makes the calculation of the log-likelihood quite
fast. To start up the recursive computation of the log-likelihood, we set the required
variables equal to their expectation without conditioning on the information set.
D Regime Inference
As stated in footnote 10, the smoothed probability that the regime was rt at time t,
pT (rt), can be computed recursively. More generally, any ex post regime probability
p¿ (rt), for a given future time ¿ 2 ft; t + 1; : : : ; Tg, can be calculated in a recursive
manner. This claim, which we prove in this appendix, is based on the following recursive
process for the two-regime ex post probability p¿ (rt; rt¡1) starting from the ex ante
probability pt¡1(rt; rt¡1).
Using an assumption similar to the one below (9), we can write p¿ (rt; rt¡1) for the
four regime combinations as
p¿ (rt; rt¡1) = p¿¡1(rt; rt¡1 js¿ )
=
p¿¡1(s¿ jrt; rt¡1) ¢ p¿¡1(rt; rt¡1)P
rt;rt¡1=1;2 p¿¡1(s¿ jrt; rt¡1) ¢ p¿¡1(rt; rt¡1)
. (12)
Suppose rst that ¿=t. Then p¿ (rt; rt¡1) follows directly from (12), as p¿¡1(rt; rt¡1)
and p¿¡1(s¿ jrt; rt¡1) are known from the estimation process (see appendix C).
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Let us suppose from now on that ¿ > t. The computation of (12) requires two
inputs. The rst one is the previous ex post probability p¿¡1(rt; rt¡1), which is known
from the previous recursion for all combinations of rt and rt¡1. The second ingredient
of (12) is the density p¿¡1(s¿ jrt; rt¡1) for all regime outcomes. Its computation requires
a number of steps. We rst write it as
p¿¡1(s¿ jrt; rt¡1) =
X
r¿ ;r¿¡1=1;2
p¿¡1(s¿ jr¿ ; r¿¡1) ¢ p¿¡1(r¿ ; r¿¡1jrt; rt¡1), (13)
where we use that the conditional distribution of s¿ given r¿ ; r¿¡1 does not depend on
the earlier regimes rt and rt¡1. This formula itself has two ingredients. The rst one
is the density p¿¡1(s¿ jr¿ ; r¿¡1) for all regime combinations, which is known from the
estimation process.
The second term needed in (13) is the (¿¡t)-period-ahead regime-switching prob-
ability p¿¡1(r¿ ; r¿¡1jrt; rt¡1) for all regime combinations. Once it has been computed,
it should be saved, since it will be needed in the next recursive step. Making use of the
Markov structure of the regime process, it can be written in terms of (¿¡1¡t)-period-
ahead switching probabilities:
p¿¡1(r¿ ; r¿¡1jrt; rt¡1) =
X
r¿¡1;r¿¡2=1;2
p¿¡1(r¿ ; r¿¡1jr¿¡1; r¿¡2) ¢ p¿¡1(r¿¡1; r¿¡2jrt; rt¡1).
(14)
Again, we have two ingredients. First, we need p¿¡1(r¿ ; r¿¡1jr¿¡1; r¿¡2) for all regime
combinations. Due to the Markov property of the regime process, this switching prob-
ability does not depend on r¿¡2. It equals
p¿¡1(r¿ ; r¿¡1jr¿¡1; r¿¡2) = p¿¡1(r¿ jr¿¡1), (15)
which is known from the estimation process.
The second ingredient of (14) is p¿¡1(r¿¡1; r¿¡2jrt; rt¡1) for all regime combinations.
Using an assumption similar to the one below formula (9), we get
p¿¡1(r¿¡1; r¿¡2jrt; rt¡1) = p¿¡2(r¿¡1; r¿¡2jrt; rt¡1; s¿¡1)
=
p¿¡2(s¿¡1jr¿¡1; r¿¡2) ¢ p¿¡2(r¿¡1; r¿¡2jrt; rt¡1)P
r¿¡1;r¿¡2=1;2 p¿¡2(s¿¡1jr¿¡1; r¿¡2) ¢ p¿¡2(r¿¡1; r¿¡2jrt; rt¡1)
,
(16)
where we use that the conditional density of s¿¡1 is independent of the previous regimes
rt; rt¡1 once r¿¡1; r¿¡2 are given. We have two ingredients. First, the conditional
density p¿¡2(s¿¡1jr¿¡1; r¿¡2) for all regime combinations. It is known from the es-
timation process. Second, we need the (¿¡1¡t)-period-ahead switching probability
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p¿¡2(r¿¡1; r¿¡2jrt; rt¡1) for all regime combinations. This one was saved during the
previous recursion, if ¿ > t+ 1. If ¿=t+ 1, it equals one.
This completes the algorithm to compute (13), which is the second ingredient of
(12). For each recursion one has to compute (16), use it together with (15) to compute
(14) and use this to compute (13). Using this in (12) yields the ex post probabil-
ity p¿ (rt; rt¡1) from p¿¡1(rt; rt¡1). Therefore, starting from the ex ante probability
pt¡1(rt; rt¡1) one can recursively compute the ex post probability p¿ (rt; rt¡1) and even-
tually the probability of interest p¿ (rt).
E Forecasting
Subsection 3.5 deals with forecasting exchange rate levels S¿ at time t¡1, where ¿ ¸ t.
This appendix explains how to compute these forecasts.
As usual, we rst decompose the exchange rate forecast as




To calculate Et¡1fsig, we rewrite si by repeated substitution of lags of (2) for the











pt¡1(ri; rt¡1) = pt¡1(rt¡1) ¢ pt¡1(ri jrt¡1), (19)
where pt¡1(rt¡1) follows after summation of pt¡1(rt¡1; rt¡2) in (10) over rt¡2.
To compute the multi-period-ahead switching probability pt¡1(rijrt¡1) in (19), we
rst form the conditional one-period-ahead Markov transition matrices:
Mt¡1;j¡1 =
2664 pt¡1(rj=1 jrj¡1=1) 1¡ pt¡1(rj=2 jrj¡1=2)
1¡ pt¡1(rj=1 jrj¡1=1) pt¡1(rj=2 jrj¡1=2)
3775 , j = t; : : : ; i.
(20)
For j=t, the elements of Mt¡1;j¡1 follow from (7); for j>t, we approximate Mt¡1;j¡1
by Mt¡1;t¡1. The theory of Markov processes for multi-period-ahead switching proba-
bilities then implies that
pt¡1(ri jrt¡1) = (Mt¡1;t¡1i¡(t¡1))rirt¡1 . (21)
Having explained how to calculate (19), we can now compute (18). Computation
of (18) for all i and substitution in (17) then gives the forecast of interest Et¡1fS¿g.
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Table 1: Moments of exchange rate returns and autocorrelation tests.
GERMANY JAPAN U.K.
Mean 0:03 0:07 ¡0:03
Variance 2:14 2:11 2:13
Skewness ¡0:14 0:53 ¡0:40
Excess Kurtosis 1:70 2:01 3:00
Autocorr. ½1 0:07¤ 0:05 0:04
(0:03) (0:04) (0:04)
Autocorr. eQ10 14:07 22:57¤ 6:05
[0:17] [0:01] [0:81]
Autocorr. squares ½s1 0:11¤ 0:20¤ 0:20 ¤
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
Autocorr. squares Qs10 57:60¤ 92:03¤ 151:82 ¤
[0:00] [0:00] [0:00]
Standard errors in parentheses and p-values in square brackets; * is signicant at 5% level.
The rst-order autocorrelation, ½1, has been estimated as the slope coe¢cient in a regression of the
change, st, on the rst lagged change, st¡1, and a constant. The standard errors are based on Whites
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent asymptotic covariance matrix.eQ10 denotes a modied Box-Pierce type statistic that combines the rst ten autocorrelations. Following
Pagan and Schwert (1990), it is dened as the sum of the rst ten squared normalized autocorrelation
estimates, where the normalizing factors are the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the
autocorrelation estimates. eQ10 is asymptotically Â210 distributed.
The rst-order autocorrelation in the squared changes, ½s1, and the Box-Pierce type statistic Q
s
10 are
similarly dened, although without the correction for heteroskedasticity
26
Table 2: Simulated p-values for PPP tests and sensitivity to nuisance parameters.
Basic Sensitivity analysis
case Sensitivity to Efstg Sensitivity to ¹2¡¹1
Unconditional mean Efstg -0:01 0:1 0 -0:1 0 0 0
Wedge regime means ¹2¡¹1 0:43 0:4 0:4 0:4 0:2 0:4 0:6
Critical value of PPP test b¦ 3:22 2:23 3:06 3:39 2:45 3:06 3:81
P-value Germany (b¦=5:46) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:01 0:00 0:00 0:01
Japan (b¦=3:14) 0:05 0:01 0:05 0:06 0:02 0:05 0:09
U.K. (b¦=4:61) 0:01 0:01 0:01 0:03 0:00 0:01 0:04
The column labeled Basic case contains the p-values that are used in the main text. These are
computed from exchange rate and PPP rate processes simulated from parameter values that are equal
to the average estimates of the model without PPP (see footnote 15).
The sensitivity analysis is based on di¤erent combinations of Efstg and ¹2¡¹1. To transform each
(Efstg; ¹2¡¹1) into the structural parameters ¹1 and ¹2, we assume for simplicity that the unconditional
regime probabilities are both 0.5, so that ¹1 = Efstg¡1=2(¹2¡¹1) and ¹2 = Efstg+1=2(¹2¡¹1). This
is obtained by taking p11= p22, which we set at 0:987, the average of the values in footnote 15. The
other parameters are kept at the average parameter estimates of the model without PPP (see footnote
15).
Further details about the simulation procedure are in Appendix B.
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Table 3: Estimation results.
GERMANY JAPAN U.K.
RW noPPP PPP RW noPPP PPP RW noPPP PPP
Mean of ¹1 0:03 -0:27¤ -0:29¤ 0:01 -0:30 -0:36¤ 0:01 -0:30¤ -0:31¤
regime (0:04) (0:09) (0:07) (0:03) (0:15) (0:09) (0:03) (0:09) (0:10)
¹2 0:15¤ 0:20¤ 0:13 0:09¤ 0:14¤ 0:16¤
(0:07) (0:05) (0:07) (0:03) (0:06) (0:05)
Autocorr. µ 0:07¤ 0:06¤ 0:04 0:05 -0:01 -0:01
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
Regime p11 0:992 0:976 0:981
stay prob (0:010) (0:028) (0:021)
p22 0:996 0:983 0:992
(0:007) (0:019) (0:013)
Logit ±10 10:98¤ 8:08¤ 5:85¤
intercept (3:12) (2:56) (1:34)
post- ±11 -7:77¤ 0 -4:44¤
Louvre (3:09) (1:65)
±20 10:28¤ 9:10¤ 5:63¤
(2:82) (2:96) (1:19)
±21 -4:93¤ 0 -1:31
(2:18) (1:34)
PPP ±ppp 17:18 13:53 8:13
deviation (7:29) (7:63) (4:23)
Uncond. ¾2 2:89 3:11 3:07 1:82 1:62 1:80 2:86 2:81 2:73
variance (1:08) (1:41) (1:35) (0:87) (0:84) (0:90) (1:11) (1:11) (1:06)
ARCH ® 0:13¤ 0:14¤ 0:15¤ 0:07¤ 0:07¤ 0:07¤ 0:11¤ 0:10¤ 0:10¤
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02)
GARCH ¯ 0:84¤ 0:83¤ 0:82¤ 0:92¤ 0:92¤ 0:92¤ 0:88¤ 0:89¤ 0:89¤
(0:04) (0:04) (0:04) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02)
T-dist. º¡1 0:12¤ 0:14¤ 0:14¤ 0:20¤ 0:21¤ 0:21¤ 0:20¤ 0:22¤ 0:21¤
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:02) (0:03) (0:03)
Log-likelihood -2126 -2116 -2110 -2053 -2044 -2043 -2068 -2062 -2057
minus RW 0 9:34 15:82 0 8:91 10:41 0 6:34 11:28
Standard errors in parentheses; * is signicant at 5% level.
RW denotes the random walk, noPPP (PPP) the regime-switching model without (with) al-
lowance for PPP (see (1) and (7), respectively.)
Because of our evidence in favor of PPP, the PPP deviation St¡1¡Spppt¡1 in (7) is stationary. Therefore,
the t-values for all parameters except ±ppp have the standard (normal) asymptotic distribution, so that
one can use standard inference. For ±ppp the t-value may well have a non-standard limit distribution,
so that we do not know for sure whether the estimates in the table are signicant.
The two zeros in table 3 for Japan indicate that we have to impose ±21=±22=0 to achieve convergence.
This restriction is realistic, as gure 2A shows no signs of a structural break in the yen-dollar swings
after the Louvre accord.
We present the inverse of the degrees of freedom of the t-distribution, because testing for conditional
normality then boils down to simply testing whether º¡1 di¤ers signicantly from zero.
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Table 4: Diagnostic statistics for normalized residuals and their squares.
GERMANY JAPAN U.K.
RW noPPP PPP RW noPPP PPP RW noPPP PPP
Autocorr. ½1 0:10¤ 0:01 0:01 0:08¤ 0:01 0:01 0:06¤ 0:04 0:03
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
Autocorr. Q10 24:40¤ 6:47 6:53 34:11¤ 17:37 18:86¤ 16:32 6:37 5:87
[0:01] [0:78] [0:77] [0:00] [0:07] [0:04] [0:09] [0:78] [0:83]
Autocorr. ½s1 -0:05 -0:05 -0:06 0:06¤ 0:06¤ 0:06¤ 0:03 0:04 0:04
(0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03) (0:03)
Autocorr. Qs10 16:32 15:87 17:75 11:13 11:16 10:99 9:31 9:91 10:21
[0:09] [0:10] [0:06] [0:35] [0:35] [0:36] [0:50] [0:45] [0:42]
Standard errors in parentheses and p-values in square brackets; * is signicant at 5% level.
RW denotes the random walk, noPPP (PPP) the regime-switching model without (with) al-
lowance for PPP (see (1) and (7), respectively.)
The residual is the exchange rate change minus the estimate of its conditional expectation Et¡1fstg.
The regime probability to integrate out the unobserved regimes in this expectation can be found in
appendix C. The residual is normalized by its variance, Vt¡1fstg. Note that it is not equal to the
error variance Vt¡1f"tg, since the possibility of regime-switches is an additional source of variance of
the residuals besides the one represented by the error term.
All autocorrelation statistics have been dened below table 1, although the standard error of ½1 and
the value of Q10 are no longer corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table 5: In-sample forecasting statistics.
GERMANY JAPAN U.K.
RW noPPP PPP RW noPPP PPP RW noPPP PPP
Panel A: One-week horizon
RMSE 1:464 1:458 1:448 1:454 1:449 1:452 1:459 1:455 1:445
MAE 1:095 1:085 1:080 1:041 1:033 1:033 1:043 1:038 1:034
Correct direction 0:527¤ 0:562¤ 0:562¤ 0:484 0:548¤ 0:552¤ 0:507 0:560¤ 0:561¤
(0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014) (0:014)
Panel B: One-quarter horizon
RMSE 5:941 5:959 5:522 6:305 6:368 6:369 5:974 5:944 5:482
MAE 4:814 4:757 4:347 4:956 4:916 4:914 4:585 4:485 4:217
Correct direction 0:530 0:576¤ 0:687¤ 0:539 0:586¤ 0:591¤ 0:492 0:579¤ 0:647¤
(0:045) (0:041) (0:036) (0:047) (0:038) (0:045) (0:046) (0:039) (0:038)
Panel C: One-year horizon
RMSE 12:945 13:487 11:035 14:059 14:751 14:280 12:891 12:911 9:724
MAE 10:585 10:338 8:411 11:042 11:581 11:210 10:722 10:280 7:668
Correct direction 0:534 0:597¤ 0:736¤ 0:609¤ 0:535 0:648¤ 0:480 0:589 0:767¤
(0:065) (0:056) (0:049) (0:063) (0:049) (0:057) (0:065) (0:054) (0:046)
Standard errors in parentheses; * is signicantly greater than 0.5 at 5% level.
RW denotes the random walk, noPPP (PPP) the regime-switching model without (with) al-
lowance for PPP (see (1) and (7), respectively.)
Correct direction denotes the fraction of forecasts that yield the correct direction of change of the
exchange rate level. For the one-quarter and one-year horizon the standard errors have been corrected
for autocorrelation as explained in footnote 11.
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Table 6: Out-of-sample forecasting statistics.
GERMANY JAPAN U.K.
RW noPPP PPP RW noPPP PPP RW noPPP PPP
Panel A: One-week horizon
RMSE 1:523 1:526 1:526 1:511 1:515 1:544 1:465 1:473 1:463
MAE 1:133 1:136 1:139 1:097 1:099 1:098 1:000 1:006 1:012
Correct direction 0:512 0:531 0:502 0:454 0:484 0:539 0:459 0:502 0:502
(0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:029) (0:029)
Panel B: One-quarter horizon
RMSE 5:612 5:680 5:810 6:490 6:562 7:643 5:638 5:759 5:506
MAE 4:589 4:663 4:575 5:106 5:026 5:935 3:671 3:784 3:928
Correct direction 0:438 0:486 0:599 0:503 0:545 0:575 0:490 0:483 0:594
(0:075) (0:076) (0:072) (0:081) (0:071) (0:075) (0:074) (0:048) (0:071)
Panel C: One-year horizon
RMSE 10:151 11:033 13:301 12:765 12:803 20:394 9:470 9:515 8:253
MAE 8:807 9:489 11:528 11:059 10:787 17:234 6:995 7:297 7:339
Correct direction 0:455 0:498 0:573 0:605 0:628 0:553 0:522 0:522 0:684¤
(0:101) (0:095) (0:095) (0:106) (0:080) (0:101) (0:095) (0:095) (0:084)
Standard errors in parentheses and p-values in square brackets; * is signicantly greater than 0.5 at
5% level.
RW denotes the random walk, noPPP (PPP) the regime-switching model without (with) al-
lowance for PPP (see (1) and (7), respectively.)
The whole series except for the last quarter has been used for estimation, while the last quarter (304
weeks from November 1, 1991 to July 22, 1997) has been used for forecasting. This means that for the
one-quarter (year) horizon there are 292 (253) comparisons between the actual and predicted values.
Correct direction denotes the fraction of forecasts that yield the correct direction of change of the
exchange rate level. For the one-quarter and one-year horizon the standard errors have been corrected
for autocorrelation as explained in footnote 11.
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Figure 1: German mark over the sample period April 1974 to July 1997.
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Figure 2: Japanese yen over the sample period April 1974 to July 1997.
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Figure 3: U.K. pound over the sample period April 1974 to July 1997.
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Figure 4: Behavior of future PPP deviations for di¤erent ±ppp (measuring the strength
with which the exchange rate is pulled towards PPP).
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